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The Functionality Doctrine in Trade Dress
and Copyright Infringement Actions:




When protecting the design features of a useful article, the outcome
of an infringement suit depends on one concept: functionality. The de-
sign features of a useful article may qualify for both trade dress protec-
tion under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,' and copyright protection
under the 1976 Copyright Act.' Trade dress protection extends to the
appearance of an article, such as its shape or exterior detail. Similarly,
copyright protection extends to the pictorial, graphic and sculptural fea-
tures of an article's appearance, and may be available for the shape and
exterior detail of an article.' However, in both trade dress infringement
actions5 and copyright infringement actions, 6 protection will be denied if
the design features of the article are also considered functional.
Although functionality is a common defense, courts employ different
tests for determining functionality in trade dress and copyright infring-
ment actions.
The functionality doctrine is an elusive one; courts have achieved
greater success in devising and verbalizing the tests for determining func-
tionality for copyright infringement actions than for trade dress infringe-
ment actions. The trade dress arena is especially problematic because the
federal courts have developed a myriad of functionality tests. According
to one attorney litigating trade dress claims, "the concept of 'functional-
* J.D. Candidate May 1990, Hastings College of the Law; B.A., Classics, University of
California, Los Angeles.
1. Lanham Trademark Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 113(a) (1988).
3. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 517 (10th Cir. 1987).
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The statutory definition of "pictorial, graphic and sculp-
tural works" contains the non-functionality requirement. Id.
5. See Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir.
1988). Trade dress protection also extends to a product's packaging. Id.
6. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 113 (1988).
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ity' is one that has confused and split the federal circuits, leaving federal
district judges, at best, nonplussed at how to explain functionality to a
jury."7 Fashioning an understandable and proper jury charge often takes
a great deal of judicial and attorney time.'
This Note discusses the functionality doctrine in copyright infringe-
ment actions and section 43(a) trade dress infringement actions. Part I
focuses on the copyright law definition of functionality and discusses the
currently accepted copyright test for functionality, as well as earlier tests.
Part II of this Note examines the functionality doctrine in trade
dress infringement actions. This author believes that the federal courts
need to adopt functionality tests which are most capable of practical and
uniform application, and which effectuate rather than reiterate the policy
goals behind the functionality doctrine. Toward this end, Part II synthe-
sizes functionality tests from recent case law because as it stands now,
opinions are complicated by nine different verbal formulations of
functionality.9
Finally, Part III succinctly restates and critiques these functionality
tests. This Note contends that the courts should acknowledge the differ-
ence between "mechanical" and "non-mechanical" products. Specifi-
cally, for mechanical products, the courts should use the "dictated by
superior utilitarian characteristics" test. ' To determine whether the fea-
tures of a non-mechanical product are functional, courts should borrow
copyright law's conceptual separability requirement and its accompany-
ing "independent judgment" test."
7. Stewart, "Functionality" Under Lanham Act Confuses and Splits Appeals Courts, Nat'l
L.J., Mar. 31, 1986, at 18.
8. Id.
9. Justice Coffey recently made this observation in Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles,
870 F.2d 1176, 1188 (7th Cir. 1988); see also infra § IIIA of this note.
10. See Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1984).
11. See Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987)
(aesthetic elements can be identified as reflecting the designer's artistic judgment, exercised
independently of functional considerations).
Applying the "independent judgment" test, if the feature is not conceptually separable
from the physical design of the non-mechanical product, such that the feature cannot be identi-
fied as reflecting the designer's independent judgment, exercised independently from mechani-







Copyright law grants exclusive rights to the creators of "original
works of authorship." 2 Protection is not limited to the fine arts; it also
encompasses the designs of useful articles.' 3 As the U.S. Supreme Court
stated in the landmark case Mazer v. Stein: "Individual perception of the
beautiful is too varied a power to permit a narrow or rigid conception of
art.""4 The Court held that original works of art do not cease to be eligi-
ble for copyright protection as works of art simply because they are
embodied in useful articles.' 5 Specifically, Mazer upheld the copyright-
ability of a statuette depicting a female dancer that was used as a lamp
base. 6 The 1976 Copyright Act adopted the Mazer holding by declaring
works of artistic craftsmanship eligible for copyright protection. 
7
12. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). Section 102(a) sets forth the "[slubject matter of copyright, in
general." It provides, in part: "(a) Copyright subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later devel-
oped, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either di-
rectly or with the aid of a machine or device." Id.
13. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1988). See also H.R. REP No. 1476, 9th Cong., 2d Sess. 54,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5667.
14. Mazer v Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 202, 219.
17. In Mazer, the Court applied the 1909 Copyright Act to determine that "works of art"
incorporated in the designs of useful articles are copyrightable. At the time of its decision, the
1909 Copyright Act provided copyright protection to "all the writings of an author," including
"Works of Art; models or designs for works of art." Copyrights Act, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat.
1075, 1077 (1909). Although the 1909 Act did not explicitly provide copyright protection to
the design elements of useful articles, the Court pointed to a 1948 Copyright Office Regulation
that expanded the scope of copyright protection to include works of artistic craftsmanship,
subject to a functionality requirement:
Works of art: (Class G)-(a) In General. This class includes works of artistic crafts-
manship, in so far as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian function are
concerned, such as artistic jewelry, enamels, glassware, and tapestries, as well as
works belonging to the fine arts, such as paintings, drawings and sculpture.
37 CFR § 202.8 (1949). In reaching its decision, the Mazer court endorsed this regulation. See
Mazer, 347 U.S. at 212-14; Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 416 (2d Cir.
1985).
After the Mazer decision, the Copyright Office issued new regulations to reflect the Mazer
interpretation of "works of art." These regulations stated in part:
(c) If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that the article is
unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art. However, if the
shape of a utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic sculpture, carving,
or pictorial representation, which can be identified separately and are capable of ex-
isting as a work of art, such features will be eligible for registration.
37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1959) (as amended June 18, 1959 (revoked 1978)).
The 1976 Copyright Act adopted both the Copyright Office Regulations and the Mazer
decision. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess 54-55, 105, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
1990]
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The Copyright Act provides that the design features of a useful arti-
cle may be copyrightable as a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work.'"
The Copyright Act defines a useful article as "an article having an intrin-
sic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the
article or to convey information. An article that is itself normally a part
of a useful article is considered a 'useful article.' "19 The dictionary de-
fines utilitarian as something "characterized by or aiming at utility as
distinguished from beauty or ornament."
'2°
The Copyright Act, however, denies protection to the design fea-
tures of useful articles when those design features are considered func-
tional:21 Only those pictorial, graphic and sculptural features that can be
identified as being physically or conceptually separable from the func-
tional aspects of the article are protected by copyright.22 Therefore,
functionality arises as a defense to copyright infringement actions. But
the Copyright Act is silent as to a test for separability, leaving the courts
with the task of determining when an element is separable.
CONG. & ADMIN. 5659, 5667-68, 5720; Barnhart 773 F.2d at 417. The term "pictorial,
graphic and sculptural works" includes works of artistic craftsmanship. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102
(1988).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Pictorial, graphic and sculptural works are just one category of
copyrightable subject matter. Id. In addition, 17 U.S.C. § 113(a) specifically grants copyright
protection to useful articles: "Scope of exclusive rights in pictorial, graphic and sculptural
works: Subject to the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the exclusive right to
reproduce a copyrighted pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work in copies under section 106
includes the right to reproduce the work in or on any kind of article, whether useful or other-
wise" (emphasis added).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
20. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2525 (1986).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 101 states:
"Pictorial, graphic and sculptural works" include two-dimensional and three-dimen-
sional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproduc-
tions, maps, globes, charts, technical drawings, diagrams and models. Such works
shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their
mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as de-
fined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only,
and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing indepen-
dently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.
22. In defining "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works," the Copyright Act sets forth the
basis of this limitation: "The design of useful articles . . . shall be considered a pictorial,
graphic or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates picto-
rial, graphic or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of
existing independently of the utilitarian aspects of the article." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis
added). The House Report accompanying the 1976 Copyright Act further declares that copy-
right protection for useful articles extends to those aesthetic elements that "physically or con-
ceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of the article." H.R. REP.
No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 46, 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-




The statutory provisons governing the copyrightability of useful ar-
ticles reflect Congress' concern with removing efficient and aesthetically
pleasing new designs from the public domain. Specifically, Congress in-
tended the functionality doctrine to ensure (1) the availability of compe-
tition, (2) the availability of quality products, and (3) the advancement of
technology through copying and modification.2 3 The separability test
"draw[s] as clear a line as possible between copyrightable works of ap-
plied art and uncopyrightable works of industrial design. "24
Alternatively, the functionality doctrine can be viewed as an appli-
cation of copyright law's idea/expression distinction. By granting pro-
tection to expressions, rather than ideas, the law provides a limited
monopoly rather than a complete monopoly. This results in the maxi-
mum benefit to society: giving an individual a monopoly over his original
expresssion encourages that person to create artistic works, while prohib-
iting a monopoly on ideas encourages others to create artistic works.
When an idea can only be expressed in a limited number of ways, the
idea and expression merge. A concern for the negative effect of granting
a monopoly on ideas takes priority and protection is denied. Similarly,
the functionality doctrine limits the monopoly granted on the design of
useful articles. When the functional element cannot be separated from
the aesthetic elements, a merger of the functional and artistic aspects has
occurred, and protection physically or conceptually is denied.25
23. See, e.g., G. NELSON, DESIGN, 170 (1979) (experience suggests that free copying re-
sults in a more rapid development); Comment, Copyright Protection for Mass Produced Com-
mercial Products, A Review of Developments Following Mazer v. Stein, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 807,
819 & 822 (1971); Note, Protection for the Artistic Aspects of Articles of Utility, 72 HARV. L.
REV. 1520, 1532-34 (1959).
24. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5668. Legislation granting copyright protection to industrial designs has
been proposed, but not enacted, further confirming Congress' concern with not removing effi-
cient and pleasing new designs in useful articles from the public domain. See H.R. REP. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 46, 49-50, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5659, 5662-63. The bill would have granted protection to the two-dimensional or three-dimen-
sional features of shape and surface that make up the appearance of an article, but do not
satisfy the current physical or conceptual separability requirement of copyright law. Design
patents for pleasing new designs of useful articles are difficult to obtain because the require-
ments of novelty and non-obviousness are difficult to satisfy. Id. The Department of Justice
opposed the legislation on policy grounds, arguing that design patents were as far as the law
should go in protecting industrial or ornamental designs. H.R. REP. No. 2223, tit. II,
§ 210(b)(2), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 139-40 (1975). Design patents are currently available to
inventors of ornamental designs of useful articles, but they are extremely difficult to obtain
because patent law requires inventions to be novel and non-obvious. In the opinion of the
Department of Justice, the burdens of the proposed legislation outweighed the benefits. Id.
25. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219.
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C. Tests Developed by the Courts
The federal courts have fashioned various tests for determining
when an aesthetic feature is physically or conceptually separable from
the functional elements of an article. One test, physical separability, ex-
ists when the aesthetic features of an object remain intact after removing
all features necessary for the utilitarian function of the article.26 For ex-
ample, a ceramic figurine attached to the handle of a coffee mug or the
animal figurine placed on the hood of a Jaguar automobile are physically
separable.27 When the coffee mug and car are removed, the figurines
remain. Conversely, the figurines can be removed without altering the
usefulness of the handle or the car.
Determining conceptual separability is more complex. The Second
Circuit's "independent judgment" test from Brandir v. Cascade seems
likely to become the generally accepted standard.28 Under this test, con-
ceptual separability exists if the aesthetic elements can be identified as
reflecting the designer's artistic judgment, exercised independently of
functional influences.29 If the design elements reflect a merger of aes-
thetic and functional considerations, then the artistic aspects of the work
are not conceptually separable.3" In Brandir, the court held that the rib-
bon design of a bike rack was not copyrightable because the design was
significantly influenced by the functional requirements of a bike rack. As
proof of this, the court noted that the rack's creator had altered the de-
sign to save space.3"
Although the Brandir court's "independent judgment" test has
emerged as a dominant standard, two earlier Second Circuit cases ap-
plied different tests, which illustrate the difficulty of determining concep-
tual separability.32 In Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., the
court used an "I know it when I see it" approach in finding the shape of a
26. M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT, § 2.08(B), 2-97 (1978) (citing Norris Indus.,
Inc. v. Int'l Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 923 (11 th Cir. 1983) cert. denied,
464 U.S. 818 (1983)).
27. Id. § 2.08(B), 2-98.
28. Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
29. Id. at 1145, 1146-47 (citing Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested
Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 741, 745 (1983)).
30. Id. at 1145.
31. Id. at 1147.
32. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980); Barnhart
v. Economy Cover Corp., 733 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
In support of the "independent judgment" test, the Brandir court argued that it was con-
sistent with the Kieselstein-Cord and Barnhart decisions. In Kieselstein-Cord, the artistic as-
pects of the belt reflected purely aesthetic choices which were made independently from the
buckle's function. In Barnhart, by contrast, the distinctive features of the torsos were incorpo-
rated to further the usefulness of the torso as mannequins. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145-46.
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belt buckle conceptually separable from its utilitarian function.33 How-
ever, the court offered almost no rationale for its finding, noting only that
the belt was used as a necklace by some,34 had been accepted by the
Metropolitan Museum of Art, and that the design was the result of the
author's inspiration.35
The same court devised the "neccessity" test in Barnhart v. Econ-
omy Cover Corp. Under this test, a feature is not conceptually separable
if it is in any way required by the utilitarian function. 6 In Barnhart, the
plaintiff created mannequins with anatomical features embodying the
shape and detail of a shirt. The court denied copyright protection after
deciding that a mannequin torso must have some configuration of the
chest and some width of the shoulder in order to serve its utilitarian
function. 1
7
The dissent in Barnhart discussed several different tests: the "pri-
mary/subsidiary" test, the "market approach" and the "ordinary ob-
servor" test. The "primary/subsidiary" test states that conceptual
separability exists whenever the decorative or aesthetically pleasing as-
pects of the article are primary and the utilitarian function is subsidi-
ary. a" The subjective nature of this test, however, would make it difficult
for the trier of fact.39 Under the "market approach," conceptual separa-
bility exists whenever there is any substantial likelihood that the article
would be marketable to a significant segment of the community solely for
its aesthetic qualities.4 The "ordinary observer" test asks whether the
ordinary observer experiences two separate conceptions: an appreciation
of the feature as an artistic work, and a recognition of the feature as
functional. If the two impressions are not entertained simultaneously,
then conceptual separability exists.4" Arguably, this test would still deny
copyright protection to designs of useful articles that are simply aestheti-
cally pleasing and thus would not subvert the intent of Congress.42 As
with the "primary/subsidiary" test, the ethereal nature of the ordinary
observer test would also make it difficult for a trier of fact to apply.43
33. 632 F.2d at 993.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 991. According to the creator, his inspiration for the shape of the buckle was
the shape of the Winchester rifle of Old West fame. Id.
36. Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 418.
37. Id. at 419.
38. Id. at 421.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 421-22.
41. Id. at 422-23. The Barnhart dissent endorsed this test. Id.
42. See id.




Trade Dress Infringement Actions
A. Overview
The term "trade dress" encompasses a complex composite of fea-
tures: size, color, texture, and graphics." Trade dress protection ex-
tends to both the appearance of the product and its packaging.45
Originally, trade dress protection was not available for the design of a
product itself.
46
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides a federal cause of action
for trade dress infringement.47 In order to succeed on a 43(a) claim, the
plaintiff must prove that the trade dress has acquired secondary meaning
among consumers and that a likelihood of confusion among consumers
as to the source of competing products exists.48 Additionally, there must
be a finding that the design features to be protected are not functional.49
44. "Trade dress is a term reflecting the overall general impact, usually visual, but some-
times also tactile, of all these features taken together." Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark
Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1271 (quoting SK & F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories,
Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980); accord
Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 1987) (total visual
image); John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983);
Harlequin Enter. Ltd. v. Gulf & Western Corp., 503 F. Supp. 647, 648-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(product design and format, words, symbols, collection of colors and designs)).
45. See Hartford House, 846 F.2d at 1271 (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832
F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1987) (fishing reel), which quoted American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-
Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (3d Cir. 1986)). See also LeSportsac, Inc. v.
K-Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985).
46. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), which had appellate jurisdiction
over trademark registration decisions of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), originally
ruled that products themselves were not the proper subject matter of trademarks and thus
were not protectible under existing trademark and unfair competition law. Oddi, The Func-
tions of "Functionality" in Trademark Law, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 308, 313 (1986).
47. Lanham Trademark Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). Section 43(a) provides a
federal cause of action for trade dress infringement via its prohibition against false designations
of origin, and false or misleading representation. See Hartford House, 846 F.2d at 1271;
Brunswick, 832 F.2d at 516-17.
The creator or manufacturer of a product may also formally register the trade dress as a
trademark. Id. This Note, however, focuses on infringement actions based on § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act. Even though the cases examined in this Note were decided prior to Congress'
revision of § 43(a) in 1988, the revisions make no mention of functionality. The most signifi-
cant change in § 43(a) is the addition of a civil remedy for misleading advertising.
48. Hartford House, 846 F.2d at 1271.
49. The courts are split as to whether the plaintiff or the defendant carries the burden of
proving the functionality issue. Some courts require the defendant to prove functionality. See
id. at 1271; Brunswick, 832 F.2d at 520; LeSportsac, Inc. v. K-Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 76 (2d
Cir. 1985); Vaughn Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1987). Other
courts require the plaintiff to prove non-functionality. See San Francisco Mercantile v. Beeba's
Creations, 704 F. Supp. 1005, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (citing First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer,
Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1987); Remcraft Lighting Prods. Inc. v. Maxim Lighting,
[Vol. 12:471
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Courts often refer to this as the non-functional requirement or the func-
tionality defense.50
B. Policy Considerations
Trade dress protection is a specialized form of unfair competition
and trademark laws.5 Unfair competition law is based on the theory
that in order for "free competition" to be truly "free," it must also be
"fair."52 Trade dress law protects against unfair competition by prevent-
ing the wrongful diversion of trade. 53 It also protects against consumer
deception by preventing the use of a confusingly similar trade dress.5 4 As
the Supreme Court explained:
By applying a [trade dress] to goods produced by one other than the
[trade dress] owner, the infringer deprives the owner of the goodwill
which he has spent energy, time and money to obtain.... At the same
time, the infringer deprives consumers of their ability to distinguish
among the goods of competing manufacturers.
55
The functionality doctrine prevents the otherwise inevitable clash
between free competition and trademark protection that occurs when
trade dress protection is extended beyond a product's packaging to its
design.56 Although functional products or features can indicate source
to the consumer, "there is an overriding public policy of preventing their
monopolization by preserving the public right to copy. A certain amount
of purchaser confusion may even be tolerated in order to give the public
the advantages of free competition." '57
Inc., 706 F. Supp. 855, 856 (S.D. Fla. 1989); Leisurecraft Prods., Ltd. v. Int'l Dictating Equip.,
Inc., 621 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1981); Damn I'm Good Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626
F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1980) (not clear error to place the burden on the plaintiff to prove
"non-functionality").
50. Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 1988);
Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 520 (10th Cir. 1987); LeSportsac Inc. v.
K-Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1985); Clamp Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Enco Mfg. Co., Inc.,
870 F.2d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1989).
51. The secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion requirements apply to registered
trademarks. Thus trade dress can be viewed as a kind of unregistered trademark.
52. Oddi, supra note 46, at 310-11.
53. Id. at 311.
54. Id.
55. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.14
(1982)(color of prescription drug functional because it helps elderly consumers to differentiate
medication). Although this case dealt with trade dress protection, the Supreme Court's com-
ments referred to the rationale behind trademark protection. Because trade dress and trade-
mark are closely related species of unfair competition law, courts sometimes use the terms
interchangeably.
56. Oddi, supra note 46, at 310-12.
57. In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1961). Judge Rich, who
authored this opinion, has been viewed as being "highly influential in the development of the
1990]
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C. Problems with Trade Dress Functionality Tests
The task of outlining trade dress functionality tests requires distilla-
tion because the courts rarely set forth a clear, summary definition of
functionality. Instead, the courts engage in discussions sprinkled with
case law quotations and policy platitudes. Policy goals are difficult
enough for the courts to understand and apply, let alone a jury.58 There
is a split among courts as to whether the functionality issue is to be de-
cided as a matter of law or fact.5 9 Either way, courts should be con-
structing clear and practical tests so attorneys can know what types of
evidence to present.
Another problem in trade dress law is the courts' failure to distin-
guish between what this author denotes as "mechanical products" and
"non-mechanical products;" when devising functionality tests. A "non-
mechanical product" is a product that does not have an intrinsic utilita-
rian function. Toys, greeting cards and jewelry are examples of non-
mechanical products. Most of the functionality tests devised by the
courts lend themselves to mechanical products; when courts try to apply
the tests used for mechanical products in cases involving non-mechanical
products, confusion results.6°
D. The Functionality Tests
1. The Second Circuit and the "Essential to Use/Affects Cost or Quality"'
Test
Under this test, a feature is functional if it is "essential to use or
purpose ... or affects the cost or quality of the article."'6' A feature is
"essential to use or purpose" if the feature is "dictated by the functions to
be performed; a feature that merely accommodates a useful function is
doctrine of 'functionality' in the context of trademark registration of three-dimensional prod-
ucts." Oddi, supra note 46, at 311.
58. Most of the cases examined in this Note are appeals from grants or denials of prelimi-
nary injunctions. In such cases a judge, rather than a jury, decides the functionality issue.
Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1988); Bruns-
wick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 520 (10th Cir. 1987); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart
Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 78 (2d Cir. 1985).
59. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 76 (citing Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, 664
F.2d 769, 775 (9th Cir. 1981)) (question of fact); Clamp Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Enco Mfg. Co., Inc.,
870 F.2d 512, 514 (9th Cir. 1989) (mixed question of law and fact).
60. See generally American Greetings, Co. v. Dan-Dee Corp., 807 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.
1986) (tummy graphics on stuffed animals).
61. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 331-32 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting
Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 850-51 n. 10 (1982)); LeSportsac, 754
F.2d at 76.
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not enough." 62 A feature "affecting the cost and quality of an article is
one which permits the article to be manufactured at a lower cost ... or
one which constitutes an improvement in the operation of the goods."63
The availability of alternative designs will not result in a finding of non-
functionality if the alternative designs would affect the cost or quality of
the product.6' The test, originally Supreme Court dictum in a trade-
mark infringement case,65 was adopted by Second Circuit in Warner
Bros. v. Gay Toys.66
A subsequent Second Circuit case, LeSportsac, Inc. v. K-Mart Corp.,
used a variation of this test: the "not essential to use/primarily serves to
identify" test.67 Phrased negatively, a feature is not functional if it: (1) is
not essential to use or purpose, or does not affect cost or quality,68 and
(2) primarily serves to identify the producer.69 The lower court applied
this test to find that the combination and arrangement of design elements
on plaintiff's fashion bags were non-functional, and the LeSportsac ap-
pellate court affirmed.7"
The "primarily serves to identify" component of this test is a modi-
fied version of the now disfavored "aesthetic functionality" doctrine.7'
Under the "aesthetic functionality" doctrine, a feature is functional if itis an "important ingredient in the product's commercial success. '' 72
Thus, if a product was purchased because its features made it aestheti-
cally pleasing, those features are functional.73 The LeSportsac court
62. Gay Toys, 724 F.2d at 331 (citing In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332,
1342 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. See Brandir Int.'l v. Cascade Pacific, 834 F.2d 1142, 1148 (2d Cir. 1987); Inverness
Corp. v. Whitehall Laboratories, 678 F. Supp. 436, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
65. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850-51 n.10
(1982).
66. 724 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1983). Applying this test, the court found that the symbols on a
toy car were not functional, but merely enabled consumers to identify the toy car with a popu-
lar television show. The car, called the "General Lee," was featured in the television show
Dukes of Hazard. Id. at 329.
67. 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985).
68. Id. at 76.
69. Id. at 78. The second prong of the test is set forth as a hypothetical question for the
factfinder during a trial on the merits. The LeSportsac court was reviewing the district court's
granting of a preliminary injunction. Id.
70. Id. at 76.
71. Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 518 (10th Cir. 1987) (discussing
LeSportsac, 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985)).
72. Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952). Courts commonly
cite Pagliero to represent the "aesthetic functionality" doctrine.
73. See generally id.; Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 823-25 (3d Cir. 1981);
Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 427 (5th Cir. 1984); Fletcher, The Defense of
"Functional" Trademark Use." If What Is Functional Cannot Be A Trademark, How Can A
Trademark Be Functional?, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 249 (1985); Krieger, The Broad Sweep of
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modified the doctrine by subordinating it to the issue of consumer identi-
fication. The trier of fact decides whether consumers are primarily moti-
vated to purchase product "A" rather than a competitor's product
because (1) they find product "A's" combination of design features more
aesthetically pleasing than a competitor's product, or (2) product "A's"
features distinguish the goods as genuine rather than imitation. If the
latter, then the product's "look" primarily serves a legitimate trademark
purpose: to identify the source of the product. Accordingly, the features
qualify for trade dress protection even though they are also an " 'impor-
tant ingredient' in the product's commercial success.""
The "aesthetic functionality" doctrine has been the subject of con-
siderable controversy." Several circuits have rejected the doctrine,76 but
its fate in the Second Circuit remains unclear. Although the LeSportsac
court criticized the doctrine as over-inclusive, the court stated that the
test might be appropriate in certain circumstances. Unfortunately, the
court failed to specify which circumstances.77
In summary, the Second Circuit employs two approaches. Each ap-
proach first considers whether a feature is essential to the use or purpose
of the article, and whether it affects the cost or quality of the article.
However, the "not essential to the use/primarily serves to identify" test
adds an identification component, which requires a finding of functional-
ity if the feature primarily serves an aesthetic function instead of identify-
ing the producer of the goods.78
Subsequent cases in the Second Circuit have utilized both ap-
proaches. In Brandir International v. Cascade Pacific, the appellate court
endorsed the "essential to use/affects cost or quality" test.79 More re-
Aesthetic Functionality: A Threat to Trademark Protection of Aesthetic Product Features, 51
FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 345-46 (1982).
74. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 78.
75. See generally Oddi, supra note 46, at 337-38; Krieger, supra note 73; Fletcher, supra
note 73; Note, The Problem of Functional Features. Trade Dress Infringement Under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 77, 88 nn.84 & 85 (1982).
76. American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.
1986) (citing Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 1981); Sno Wizard
Mfg. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 426 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986); Stx, Inc. v. Trik Stik, Inc.,
708 F. Supp. 1551, 1557 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (citing First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809
F.2d 1378, 1382 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987)).
77. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 77-78.
78. See id. at 78.
79. 834 F.2d 1142, 1148 (2d Cir. 1987). The appellate court remanded the case because
the record contained no insufficient evidence of alternative designs, which the court stated was
necessary to determine whether the design elements of plaintiff's bicycle rack were essential in
terms of cost and quality. Id.
For the purposes of plaintiff's copyright infringement claim, the appellate court found
that the design was functional. The court applied the "independent judgment" test. Id. at
1146-47; See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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cently, in Inverness Corp. v. Whitehall Laboratories, a lower court applied
the test to find that the cap and container of a depilatory roll-on were not
functional.8 0 With respect to use and purpose, the court stated that alter-
native designs were conceivable which would serve the same functions of
covering the applicator and enabling the container to stand on a shelf
and be comfortably held in the the hand.8' In I. Appel Corp. v. Munsing-
wear, Inc., a lower court used the "not essential to use/primarily serves
to identify" test to find that the design features of plaintiff's sports bra
were functional.8 2
2. The "Competitively Essential/Available Alternatives" Test
The "competitively essential/available alternatives" test was en-
dorsed by the Tenth Circuit 3 and rejected by the Third Circuit.84 Under
this test, if a feature "must be slavishly copied in order for the product to
be equally functional," then the feature is competitively essential and,
therefore, functional. But if the feature "enables the second-comer sim-
ply to market his product more effectively," then the feature is not com-
petitively essential. 8' To decide these issues, the court looks at the
availability of alternative designs. In Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel, a
Tenth Circuit case, the court held that the precise shape and configura-
tion of a fishing reel's front cover were not competitively essential, and
thus not functional. In support of its finding, the court stated that other
shapes equally comfortable to hold could be used to pick up and let out
fishing line in a manner which is also easy to use.86 Although the court
referred to equally comfortable alternative designs, it rejected the "essen-
tial to use/affects cost or quality" test which also looks at the availability
of alternative designs.87
The "competitively essential/available alternatives" test does not
limit functional features to features which are essential to a product's
mechanical operation. Although the Brunswick court implicitly rejected
80. 678 F. Supp. 436, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
81. Id. The defendant did not present evidence on quality and cost, even though the court
apparently, placed the burden of proving functionality on the defendant.
82. 646 F. Supp. 685, 687-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing Lesportsac, 754 F.2d at 76, 78).
83. Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 519 (10th Cir. 1987).
84. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 1981).
85. Brunswick, 832 F.2d at 519.
86. Id. at 519-20.
87. Id. at 517. The district court in Brunswick, which also found that the features were
not functional, applied the "essential to use/affects quality" test. The Brunswick appellate
court stated that the district court's use of this test, however, did not prevent the court from
affriming the court's finding because the district court implicitly considered whether the design
was competitively "indispensable." Id. at 519-20.
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the "aesthetic functionality" doctrine,"8 it maintained that for products
with an aesthetic function, "a feature intrinsic to the aesthetic appeal of
those products" may not be entitled to trade dress protection.89 The
court recognized the difficulty of deciding when such a feature is func-
tional, and only added that "the decision should nevertheless rest on
whether alternative appealing designs or presentations of the product can
be developed." 90
Subsequently, in Hartford House Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., the
Tenth Circuit applied the Brunswick "competitively essential/available
alternatives" test to a combination of aesthetic features-the cover de-
signs of non-occasion greeting cards.91 Although the shape, printing,
colors, and illustrations could each be functional, the court examined the
combination of these features and found that the card's "look" was not
functional.92 Because "virtually every product is a combination of func-
tional and non-functional features," the court reasoned that a rule deny-
ing protection to all combinations of features that included a functional
feature "would emasculate the law of trade dress infringement."93 Sev-
eral other circuit courts support this proposition, holding that a combi-
nation of features may be non-functional, even though the combination
includes functional features.
94
As the Brunswick court suggested, the Hartford House court relied
upon the availability of alternative combinations to decide that the cover
designs were not functional: "[a]n emotional non-occasion greeting card
can be folded, colored, shaped, cut, edged, and designed in infinite ways
and still function to send its message." 95
The Third Circuit disagreed with the theory behind the "competi-
tively essential/available alternatives" test in Keene Corp. v. Paraflex In-
dustries, Inc.: "merely because there are other shapes and designs 'which
88. See id. at 518.
89. Id. at 519.
90. Id.
91. 846 F.2d 1268, 1272-74 (10th Cir. 1988).
92. Id. at 1272-74. "Paper, verse and ink are functional features of a greeting card. The
design and amalgamation of those features in a uniform fashion with other features, however,
has produced the non-functional Blue Mountain 'look.' " Id. at 1274 (quoting Hartford House
Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1540 (D. Colo. 1986)).
93. Id. at 1272 (quoting American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d
1136, 1143 (3d Cir. 1986)).
94. See American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1143 (3d
Cir. 1986); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K-Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1985); Fuddruckers,
Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 1987) (functional elements that are
separately unprotectable can be protected together as trade dress); Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc.,
812 F.2d 1531, 1537-38 n.25 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1081 (1987).
95. Hartford House, 846 F.2d at 1274 (quoting the district court's opinion in Hartford
House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1541 (D. Colo. 1986)).
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defendant could use and still produce a workable' product, the design
used is not thereby non-functional."96 In other words, the test takes an
unnecessarily narrow view of functionality.
3. The Third Circuit's "Utilitarian" and "Value as A Product" Tests
The "utilitarian" test focuses on the extent to which the design fea-
ture is related to the utilitarian function of the product. If the design is
"not significantly related to the utilitarian function of the product, but is
merely arbitrary," then the design is not functional.97 Applying this test,
the Keene court held that the design of a wall-mounted luminaire was
intrinsically related to its function rather than an arbitrary expression of
aesthetics because the luminaire must be architecturally compatible with
the structure on which it is mounted.98 Additionally, the court noted
that because only a limited number of such designs could be architectur-
ally compatible, trade dress protection would stifle competition.99
In devising the "utilitarian" test, the Keene court rejected the "aes-
thetic functionality" test. Its interpretation concentrated on the com-
mercial desirability of the feature without considering a feature's
utilitarian function. 1" The court criticized the test as an unnecessary
disincentive for the development of imaginative and attractive designs
because more appealing designs might not qualify for protection.' °1
The authority of the Keene test is questionable in light of a later
Third Circuit case, American Greetings Co. v. Dan-Dee Corp., 102 which
instead used the "value as a product" test. The "value as a product" test
replaces utilitarian value with something akin to intrinsic value and uses
producer identification as a yardstick. If a product's feature is "substan-
tially related to its value as a product or service" in the sense that it is
"part of the 'function' served," then the feature is functional. °3 But, if
96. 653 F.2d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Vaughn Novelty Mfg. Co. v. G.G. Greene
Mfg. Co., 202 F.2d 172, 175-76 n.10 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 346 U.S. 820 (1953)). The Keene
court also noted that the same approach was followed by the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals in in re Honeywell, 532 F.2d 180, 182 (C.C.P.A. 1976). Id. at 827.
97. Id. at 825.
98. Id. at 826.
99. Id. at 827.
100. Id. at 825.
101. Id. "As our ambience becomes more mechanized and banal, it would be unfortunate
were we to discourage use of a spark of originality which could transform an ordinary product
into one of grace. The doctrine of aesthetic functionality need not be construed in such a
manner for it to fulfill its important public policy function of protecting free competition." Id.
102. 807 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
103. Id. at 1142 (quoting United States Gold Ass'n v. St. Andrews Systems, Datamax, 749
F.2d 1028, 1033 (3d Cir. 1984)
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"the primary value of a particular feature is the identification of the pro-
vider," then it is not functional."°
In American Greetings, the plaintiff manufactured a line of teddy
bears known as Care Bears. 105 The controversy settled around the bears'
"tummy graphics:" the placement of varying illustrations against a
white oval background on the bear's abdominal area. Applying the
"value as a product" test, the trial court declared that the purpose of the
Care Bear was "to help children and adults express their feelings and
share them with others."10 6 The lower court then held that the tummy
graphics were functional because they conveyed the emotional message
of each bear using symbols that are typically associated with the
message.' 07 For example, the "Tenderheart Bear" heart graphic con-
veyed the message "love and caring," and the "Friend Bear's" two smil-
ing daisies conveyed the message "friendship." The placement of the
graphics against a white background on the bear's stomach was consid-
ered part of the tummy graphics and, thus, part of the functional feature
which the defendant was entitled to use in the best way possible. 108 The
appellate court affirmed both findings.'0 9
At first glance, the approach used in American Greetings is neat and
workable. A closer examination of the opinion, however, illustrates the
potential for confusion. The lower court concluded, and the appellate
court agreed, that the plaintiffs could have a protectible interest in the
Care Bears' overall appearance even though the tummy graphics were an
essential feature of that overall appearance." 0 Assuming that the plain-
tiff could establish secondary meaning, the district court stated that the
defendant "could be required to select alternative non-functional features
and utilize imitated functional ones in such a way as to avoid confusion
as to source if... feasible. '"1  Although the appellate court approved of
the district court's finding, it conceded that it did not know whether the
defendant could design such a product.' 2
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1136.
106. Id. at 1143 (quoting American Greetings Corp. v. Dandee Imports, Inc., 619 F. Supp.
1204, 1210 (D.N.J. 1985)).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1142-43.
109. Id. at 1149.
110. Id. at 1143.
111. Id. at 1144.
112. Id. at 1145.
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4. The Fifth Circuit's "Dictated by Superior or Optimal Utilitarian
Characteristics" Test
The "dictated by superior or optimal utilitarian characteristics" test
is a two-part test designed to determine whether protection would hinder
competition. The test asks (1) whether the feature is an utilitarian fea-
ture, as opposed to an aesthetic feature and (2) whether the feature is
"superior or optimal in terms of engineering, economy of manufacture,
or accommodation of utilitarian function or performance."" ' 3 A design
which merely increases utility is not functional, and commercial success
and marketing effectiveness do not make the feature "superior or
optimal." 14
The Fifth Circuit devised this test in Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v.
Cox, after rejecting the trial court's application of other functionality
tests." 5 Although the appellate court did not decide whether the design
of plaintiff's plastic lemon and lime juice bottles were functional, the
court suggested how its "dictated by superior or optimal utilitarian char-
acteristics" test might be applied. The court noted that a molded plastic
bottle can have an infinite variety of forms or designs and still function to
hold liquid." 6 In other words, because no one form was necessary or
optimal, the designs may not be functional." 7 At trial, the plaintiff intro-
duced into evidence three other plastic citrus juice bottles resembling
lemons or limes which dispensed juice by squeezing and had different
volumes, heights and caps."1 ' The defendant argued that plaintiff's bot-
tle was functional because the supermarket display racks restricted the
consumer's line of vision; compelling the defendant to use a different
height and shape would make it more difficult for consumers to read its
label. "' The court agreed that copying plaintiff's shape would enable
the defendant to market his product more successfully, but noted that the
113. Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 429 (citing An Analysis of the Ives
Case.- A TMR Panel, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 118, 126-28 (1982) (comments of J. Thomas
McCarthey)).
114. See id. at 428. This last point is not explicitly made but can be drawn from the court's
discussion of other tests and its application of the facts. The court stated: "To define function-
ality in terms of commercial success or marketing effectiveness, [as defendant suggests] would
permit a second comer to copy the distinctive dress of a product whenever it became successful
and consumers became accustomed to its dress." Id.
115. 732 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1984) (rejecting trial court's finding that plaintiff's bottle de-
sign was functional, and remanding). The trial court had applied the aesthetic functionality
doctrine. Id. at 427-28. The appellate court also felt the trial court incorrectly used the Keene
court's "competitively essential/available alternatives" test. Id. at 428.
116. Id. at 429.
117. Id. (citing In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1333, 1342 (C.C.P.A.
1982)).
118. Id. at 429.
119. Id. at 426-27.
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"dictated by superior or optimal utilitarian characteristics" test did not
consider commercial success or marketing effectiveness.120
The Seventh Circuit rejected the "dictated by superior or optimal
utilitarian characteristics" test in Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles,
Inc. because of concern that the defendant-copier would have difficulty
proving that a feature is optimal, or "the best possible way to achieve a
result."
12 1
5. The Seventh Circuit's "Effective Competition" Test
Under the Schwinn court's effective competition" test a design fea-
ture is necessary for effective competition, and thus functional, "if it is
one that is costly to design around or do without, rather than one that is
costly to have." 122 The cost comparison is between the plaintiff's design
and alternative designs, not the defendant's design. 123 Surpisingly, the
court also stated that the aesthetic appeal of a design may make it func-
tional, 124 a comment which is reminiscent of the aesthetic functionality
doctrine. 125
6. The Ninth Circuit Analysis
The Ninth Circuit's approach to functionality is inconsistent and
unclear. Recently, in Clamp Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Enco Manufac-
turing Co, 126 the Ninth Circuit purported to use a factors analysis. The
factors include: "the existence of an expired utility patent disclosing the
utilitarian advantage of the design sought to be protected as a trademark;
the extent of advertising touting the utilitarian advantages of the design;
the availability of alternative designs; and whether a particular design
results from a comparatively simple or cheap method of manufac-
ture.' ' 127 The court, then proceeded to disregard some of these factors.
The design of the clamp in question was previously covered by a utility
patent, was advertised for its utilitarian design, and was not designed in
an arbitrary or distinctive manner. Even so, the Ninth Circuit upheld
120. Id. at 428-29.
121. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In
rejecting this test, the court criticized an earlier Seventh Circuit case opinion, Vaughan Mfg.
Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 1987). Schwinn, 870 F.2d at 1188.
122. Id. at 1189 (reiterating the approach used in W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334
(7th Cir. 1985)).
123. Id. at 1191.
124. Id. at 1190-91.
125. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
126. 870 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1989).
127. Id. at 516 (citing In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340-41
(C.C.P.A. 1982).
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the trial court's finding that the design was not functional.' 2 Earlier
cases in the Ninth Circuit, however, used the "essential to use" or "af-
fects cost/quality" test. 29
III
The Proper Test
To decide which test is best, we must briefly reexamine the rationale
behind unfair competition law and its offspring, trade dress protection.
Unfair competition law is designed to protect free competition by ensur-
ing fair competition. Trade dress protection guards against unfair com-
petition by preventing wrongful diversion of trade and prevents
consumer deception by prohibiting the use of confusingly similar trade
dress. Although functional features may identify a product's source and
thus seem to justify protection, the overriding public policy of preventing
monopolization prohibits protection of functional features. 130 In essence,
the non-functional requirement provides a public right to copy functional
features. 
3 1'
A. Policy Goals in Relation to the Nine Existing Standards
The proper functionality test should effectuate these policy goals,
without sacrificing clarity and uniformity of application. The nine tests
for determining functionality, discussed in section II of this Note, are
summarized and critiqued below, in order of increasing desirability.
(1) The "aesthetic functionality" test: a feature is functional if it is
an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product; thus,
aesthetically pleasing features are designated functional if consumers are
motivated to purchase the product by its aesthetic appeal 132
The "aesthetic functionality" test has been criticized as over-inclu-
sive by the courts and commentators. 'I Arguably, in order to satisfy the
requirement of secondary meaning a product must have acquired some
128. Id. at 516 (trial court's finding was not clearly erroneous).
129. Stx, Inc. v. Trik Stik, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 1551, 1557 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Rachel v. Ba-
nana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1506-07 (9th Cir. 1987). In Rachel, the court defined
"use" as the actual benefit that consumers wish to purchase. The court upheld the trial court's
finding that the features of a synthetic animal head created for wall display in stores was
functional. The court reasoned that the plaintiff sought to create realistic reproductions, and
so the design features (eyes, nose, etc... ) were functional. Rachel, 831 F.2d at 1506-07.
130. In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
131. See id.
132. See Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952).
133. See supra notes 71-76, 100 and accompanying text. The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, which originally had appellate jurisdiction over trademark registration decisions of
the Patent and Trademark Office, consistently refused to adopt the aesthetic functionality doc-
trine. Oddi, supra note 46, at 338 (citing In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 932-33
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degree of commercial success. As one court explained, defining "func-
tionality as anything that is 'an important ingredient in the commercial
success' of a product would almost always permit a second comer freely
to copy the trade dress of a successful product that has accummulated
goodwill."' 34 The test also provides a disincentive for development of
imaginative and attractive designs. Although the encouragement of im-
aginative and attractive designs is not a goal of unfair competition law,
discouragement of such innovation is an unnecessary side effect.
(2) The "competitively essential/available alternatives" test: a com-
bination of features is functional if protection of the configuration would
hinder competition or impinge upon the rights of others to compete effec-
tively because alternative designs are not available.'-"
The "competitively essential/available alternatives" test fails to ade-
quately define what it means to "hinder competition or impinge upon the
rights of others to compete effectively."' 36  Accordingly, the test seems
to be nothing more than a restatement of the policy goals behind the
functionality doctrine; it lacks any qualitative analysis of efficiency when
considering the availability of alternative designs. Paradoxically, the
broad scope of the test may result in an unnecessarily narrow view of
functionality; a design is not made non-functional merely because there
are other shapes and designs which can be used while still producing a
workable product. "
(3) The "value as a product" test: a feature is functional if it sub-
stantially relates to the value of the product as a product, as opposed to
primarily serving to identify the producer. 3 '
This test is too broad and subjective. The trier of fact is given the
difficult task of determining the intrinsic value of the product. Addition-
ally, the emphasis on product identification may clash with the overrid-
ing public policy of preventing monopolization, because functional
features may simultaneously identify the producer.
39
(4) The "utilitarian " test: a feature is functional if it is significantly
related to the utilitarian function of the product or feature, rather than
(C.C.P.A. 1964) (Rich, J., concurring); In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1050 (C.C.P.A.
1982)(Rich, J. concurring), rev'g 211 U.S.P.Q. 834 (TTAB 1981).
134. Sicilia Di R. Biebow, 732 F.2d at 428.
135. See Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 519 (10th Cir. 1987); Hartford
House Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1272-73 (10th Cir. 1988); see supra notes
84-96 and accompanying text.
136. Brunswick, 832 F.2d at 519.
137. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries, 653 F.2d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 1981).
138. See American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d
Cir. 1986). See supra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
139. See In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
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merely arbitrarily related. A product's design is not non-functional simply
because alternative designs are available. 14
0
This test suffers from vagueness because it does not explain when
the design of a product is "significantly related to its utilitarian func-
tion."' 141 "Arbitrary selection" of a design is a conclusion rather than a
definition. Otherwise, the court would not have explicitly rejected a test
based on the availability of alternative designs.
(5) The 'factors analysis": the existence of an expired utility patent,
advertising touting the product's utilitarian advantages, the availability of
alternative designs, and whether the design results from a comparatively
simple or cheap method of manufacture all may indicate that the design
features are functional 14
2
The factors analyisis is difficult to judge because the authoring court
did not fully apply it.143 A major weakness of the test is its use of adver-
tising as a factor. A product may advertise its utilitarian design to a
greater extent than actually exists.
(6) The "essential to use/affects cost or quality" test: a feature is
functional if it is essential to use or purpose, or affects cost or quality. 1
44
This test provides well defined criteria, and serves the goals of the
functionality doctrine without being too broad.'45 A design feature is
"essential" only if the feature is dictated by the functions to be per-
formed; a feature that merely accommodates a useful function is not
enough. A design feature "affecting the cost or quality of an article" is
one which permits the article to be manufactured at a lower cost or one
which constitutes an improvement in the operation of the good.'4 6
(7) The "not essential to use/primarily serves to identify" test: a fea-
ture is functional if it is not essential to use or purpose, or affects cost or
quality, and primarily serves to identify the producer. 1
47
140. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 825, 827 (3d Cir. 1981); supra notes
96-101 and accompanying text.
141. Keene, 653 F.2d at 825.
142. See Clamp Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1989); supra text
accompanying notes 97-129.
143. Id.
144. See Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 331-32 (2d Cir. 1983); supra
notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
145. The fact pattern of Inverness Corp. v. Whitehall Laboratories, 678 F. Supp. 436
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), provides a good example. The court held that the design of a roll-on depila-
tory container and cap were not functional. Because different designs can be employed with-
out affecting the cost of production or the container's ability to stand on a shelf or to be
comfortably held, protection would not result in monopoly. Id at 440.
146. See Gay Toys, 724 F.2d at 331; LeSportsac, Inc. v. K-Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 76 (2d
Cir. 1985).
147. See LeSportsac Inc. v. K-Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 76-78 (2d Cir. 1985) and supra
notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
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The "not essential to use/primarily serves to identify" test, a varia-
tion of the prevous test, goes beyond the functionality doctrine to con-
sider the question of consumer identification, which properly is part of
the secondary meaning requirement. By partially defining "non-func-
tional" features as features that also primarily serve to identify the pro-
ducer, '4 the test clashes with the policy goals behind the functionality
doctrine. As one court explained, it is not that functional features "can-
not or do not indicate source to the purchasing public, but that there is
an overriding public policy of preventing their monopolization and pre-
serving the public right to copy."' 49
(8) The "effective competition" test: a feature is functional if it is
necessary for effective competition; a feature that is costly to design around
or do without is necessary for effective competition, and the aesthetic ap-
peal of a feature may also make it necessary for effective competition. 1
50
Arguably, this test is similar to the "essential to use/affects cost or
quality" test, although not as clearly written. The aesthetic appeal
prong, however, makes the test susceptible to the same criticism levelled
at the aesthetic functionality doctrine. 5 '
(9) The "dictated by superior utilitarian characteristics" test: a fea-
ture is functional if it is dictated by the product's utilitarian characteris-
tics, and if the feature is superior or optimal in terms of engineering,
economy of manufacture, or accommodation of utilitarian function or
performance. 152
The criteria used to determine functionality under this test seem ca-
pable of clear and uniform application, and serve the policy goals behind
the functionality doctrine. If a feature is not "superior or optimal," then
it naturally follows that a finding of non-functionality will not result in a
monopoly because alternative designs are available that are at least as
useful or efficient.
The test, however, confines the functionality defense to intrinsically
mechanical products. An intrinsically mechanical product's primary aim
is utility, rather than beauty or ornament. The test criteria preclude a
finding of functionality for non-mechanical products, those which pri-
marily produce a mental relation in users rather than help them perform
a physical task. Toys and greeting cards are examples of non-mechanical
products. Non-mechanical products primarily perform a mental rather
148. Id.
149. In re Diester Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
150. See Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1188-91 (7th Cir.
1989); supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 133-34.
152. See Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1984); supra
notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
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than a mechanical function. For example, toys and greeting cards are
non-mechanical products because they are intended to produce mental
reaction in the user. Thus, engineering, economy of manufacture, or ac-
commodation of utilitarian function or performance are not useful crite-
ria for non mechanical products. Arguably if this test had been applied
in American Greetings, the tummy graphics on the stuffed animals would
have been held not functional, because their design does not affect econ-
omy of manufacture. A finding of functionality would require a court to
stretch the meaning of the word utilitarian. However, a finding of func-
tionality does not seem appropriate because the graphics perform the
function of helping children and adults express their feelings.,
53
Because the "dictated by superior utilitarian characteristics" test
cannot be applied to non-mechanical products, another test is necessary.
One option is not to impose any functionality requirement. But, the pol-
icy goal behind the functionality doctrine and unfair competition law
works to ensure that competition is free and fair.'54 No reason exists as
to why competition should be any less fair in the marketplace for non-
mechanical products. As indicated previously, it is not that non-mechan-
ical products serve no function, but that they serve a mental rather than
a mechanical function. When there are too few means of conveying or
eliciting a particular emotional message or response, the danger of mo-
nopoly exists. On the other hand, a broad test like the aesthetic function-
ality doctrine is inappropriate because it provides a disincentive to
creators of pleasing designs and could deny trade dress protection to all
non-mechanical products.
B. Borrowing from Copyright Law to Acheive a Workable Test
In trade dress infringement actions involving non-mechanical prod-
ucts, courts should borrow copyright law's "conceptually separable" re-
quirement.' 55 If the feature of a non-mechanical product is not
conceptually separable from the physical design of the product then the
feature is functional and should be denied trade dress protection.
The fact that conceptual separability is part of copyright law does
not preclude its use in trade dress infringement actions. Although the
purposes of trade dress protection and copyright protection differ, their
non-functionality requirements each serve to prevent unwarranted mo-
153. The American Greetings court found the tummy graphics functional because they
were substantially related to the value of the product as a product: they helped children and
adults express their feelings. American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, 807 F.2d 1136,
1142-43 (3d Cir. 1986).
154. See Oddi, supra note 46 at 311-312.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 123.
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nopolies.15 6 Trade dress infringement actions further require that the
feature must have acquired secondary meaning, and that the alleged in-
fringing use must produce a likelihood of confusion in order for the
plaintiff to prevail.' 57 These elements assure that policy goals of trade-
mark law are achieved.
To date, courts have not explicitly recognized the difference between
mechanical products and non-mechanical products when fashioning
trade dress functionality tests. When dealing with mechanical products
the functionality test should be:
A feature is functional if (1) it is dictated by the product's utilitarian
characteristics or function, and (2) it is essential in terms of engineer-
ing, economy of manufacture, or accommodation of utilitarian func-
tion or performance.
If the product is non-mechanical, or without an intrinsic utilitarian func-
tion, the test should be:
A feature is functional if it is not conceptually separable from the de-
sign of the product.
Then, the currently dominant test in copyright law should be applied:
A feature is conceptually separable if the nori-mechanical characteris-
tics can be identified as reflecting the designer's independent judgment,




The functionality tests outlined herein for trade dress infringement
cases should help courts write clearer opinions and choose the most effec-
tive test. Furthermore, courts should consider distinguishing between
"mechanical products" and "non-mechanical" products, and adopt a test
for each. The "dictated by superior utilitarian characteristics" test is ide-
ally suited to mechanical products. For non-mechanical products, courts
should borrow copyright law's conceptually separable test.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 25-66.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 51-57.
158. See Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (2nd
Cir. 1987).
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